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Images are double agents. They receive information from the world, while also projecting 
visual imagination onto the world. As a result, mind and world tug our thinking about 
images, or particular kinds of images, in contrary directions. On one common division, 
world traces itself mechanically in photographs, whereas mind expresses itself through 
painting.1 Scholars of photography disavow such crude distinctions: much recent 
writing attends in detail to the materials and processes of photography, the agency 
of photographic artists, and the social determinants of the production and reception 
of photographs. As such writing makes plain, photographs cannot be reduced to 
mechanical traces.2 Yet background conceptions of photography as trace or index persist 
almost by default, as no framework of comparable explanatory power has yet emerged 
to replace them. A conception of photography adequate to developments in recent 
scholarship is long overdue. Rather than constructing such a conception top-down, 
as philosophers are wont to do, this paper articulates it by examining selected works 
by James Welling.3 There are several reasons for this: Welling’s practice persistently 
explores the resources and possibilities of photography, the effect of these explorations is 
to express a particular metaphysics of the mind’s relation to its world, and appreciating 
why this metaphysics is aptly expressed by exploring photography requires a revised 
conception of what photography is. In as much as it provides a framework for a richer 
interpretation of Welling, the new conception is also capable of underwriting a wide 
range of critical and historical approaches to photography.
Prologue: Aluminum Foil
Welling’s artistic breakthrough came in 1980 with a series of silver gelatin contact 
prints of 4 × 5″ Kodak Tri-X negatives depicting aluminium foil. Taken as a whole, 
Aluminum Foil constitutes a remarkably resolved and uncompromising early artistic 
statement. Though, technically speaking, the prints could have been produced any 
time during the previous hundred years, they would have been hard to anticipate prior 
to their creation, given the many norms of photography they seem happy to forgo.4 
Pictorially, they are difficult to resolve. They have an unrelenting, ‘all-over’ quality, 
appearing harshly lit yet very dark – an effect achieved by over-exposing in camera 
to secure sufficient density of detail in the shadow, then over-exposing again when 
printing to bring out that detail.5 Instead of the glittering array of reflections that 
one might associate with crumpled foil, one finds expanses of black or deep shadow 
punctuated by febrile highlights. Commentators often call these works ‘abstract’, but 
this description needs to be qualified. It may not be obvious what they depict, but all 
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can be seen as depicting something, and that something turns out to be crumpled foil 
filling the surface from edge to edge (plate 1 and plate 2).
Even so, Aluminum Foil resists familiar modes of engaging with photography. 
Nothing in them marks a horizon. Only indentations, ridges, and crevices relieve the 
shallow space. Natural phenomena are suggested: rocky surfaces laced with crevices, 
turbulent seas, impenetrable foliage, even dense cloud, but nothing so much as the 
surface of an alien, lifeless planet. The sensation is not one of looking out into a 
landscape oriented to the upright posture of a human body, into which one might 
imaginatively project oneself, but of looking down onto an unyielding topography that 
frustrates the eye’s ability to explore it. One can more easily imagine hovering over 
such a surface, than walking through it. The dominant mood is one of suffocating 
airlessness. David Salle described Welling’s early work as ‘pure death wish’.6
Shaping the series is an engagement with materials that can be traced all the 
way back to Welling’s pre-CalArts training in painting and sculpture. Consider the 
1 James Welling, Cascade, 
1980. Gelatin silver contact 
print, 4 5/8 × 3 3/4 in. Photo: 
Courtesy of James Welling.
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manipulation of foil. Something has taken place off camera that these photographs 
record, something ‘hands-on’ (plate 3). The work is expressive rather than cool, but its 
expressiveness is restrained and pivots almost entirely on minor variations between 
images. Indeed, the depth of self-restraint and refusal to emote evinced by these images 
is responsible for their emotional force. But it is not only foil that has been manipulated 
here. Light has also been controlled, as much through the foil’s reflective properties as 
by camera and enlarger.7 Control of light is a recurring theme of Welling’s work, in both 
his camera-less darkroom practices and his lens-based photography. In Aluminum Foil, 
Welling’s parsimonious rationing of light yields images that are pictorially hard to read – 
claustrophobic, lacking identifiable space, depth, or orienting reference points. Early on 
Rosalind Krauss drew attention to Welling’s tendency – contrary to the presumed nature 
of photography – to ‘hold the referent at bay, creating as much delay as possible between 
seeing the image and understanding what it is of’, and Welling has often spoken of his 
desire to overload his images, making them dense and difficult to decipher.8
2 James Welling, Heart of 
Glass, 1980. Gelatin silver 
contact print, 4 5/8 × 3 3/4 in. 
Photo: Courtesy of James 
Welling.
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Who could have predicted, from looking at Aluminum Foil, the large, intensely 
coloured photograms of plumbago blossoms radiating light, generated from scratch in 
the darkroom (Flowers, 2004–07, 2011, 2014)? Or the dazzling, sometimes jarring, studies 
of Phillip Johnson’s Glass House filtered and reflected through coloured gels, diffraction 
gratings, and mirrors (Glass House, 2006–09)? Or the small, gestural abstractions printed 
in cliché verre from paint on mylar as a counterpoint to Susan Howe’s Frolic Architecture 
(2010)? And how do any of these gel with the straight black and white series, such as 
Connecticut Landscape (1998–), Railroad Photographs (1987–94), or Light Sources (1977–2005)?
This diversity calls for an account of what Welling is up to. The resolute 
manipulations of the materials, processes, conventions, and norms of photography 
are hard to miss. Just as obviously, Welling’s manipulations engender powerful 
effects. Critics have remarked on both, yet a puzzle remains.9 Every artist seeks a 
consonance between means and ends: a choice of means opens up a range of ends, just 
as a particular end inflects the use of means. The puzzle is to understand the relation 
3 Production still for James 
Welling, Aluminium Foil, 135 
Grand Street, New York, 
NY, February 1980. Photo: 
Courtesy of James Welling.
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between Welling’s exploration of photographic resources, on the one hand, and his 
interest in diverse expressions of the self’s relation to its world, on the other. Solving 
this puzzle in Welling’s case requires articulating a new conception of photography 
that illuminates Welling’s interventions in various stages of the photographic process. 
That done, a question arises as to what Welling’s explorations of photography reveal 
about his work’s substantive and thematic concerns. But the new conception should 
serve the purposes of critics and historians more generally.
Photography Materialized
Welling’s oeuvre invites philosophical reflection because it not only raises the 
question of what photography is (and has been), but also the question of what 
photography might be. Of course, much photography invites theoretical reflection, 
where ‘theory’ deals with what particular forms of photography mean or do in 
particular contexts of production and reception. The philosophy of photography, 
by contrast, attempts to articulate what constitutes photography – what might be 
called its fundamental ‘nature’.10 The enterprise is easily caricatured as a quest to 
pin down an immutable essence insensitive to cultural or historical context, but 
it need not be regarded in this way. Philosophical conceptions of photography are 
better understood as tools for counterfactual thinking – for imagining photography’s 
possibility space, and for thereby appreciating all that can be done to make images 
by means of photography. By persistently exploring the resources and possibilities of 
photography from the inside, Welling is arguably doing philosophy by other means. 
Each of his series offers a practical demonstration of some hypothetical photographic 
possibility.
If this is what Welling is up to, it only pushes the interesting question back a 
step: for why is he interested in doing that? Welling’s explorations are not formal 
experiments conducted for their own sake; each series draws attention to a particular 
emotional inflection of the self’s relation to its world. Seen as a whole, Welling’s 
oeuvre is a vehicle for expressing a wide-ranging metaphysics of mind and world. The 
conception of photography proposed here is intended not only to make sense of that 
general project, but to illuminate selected series within it.
Looking beyond Welling, one finds that criticism and theory of photography 
often harbour philosophical assumptions, more or less implicitly. Take sensitivity 
to counterfactual possibility: any artistic gesture – whether deliberate or aleatory – 
is meaningful only when viewed against an implied background of other possible 
gestures. Just as obviously, the meaning of an interpretation is situated in a space of 
alternative possible readings. Background assumptions about what photography is 
capture what is possible in the medium and generate the counterfactual spaces within 
which criticism takes place. The lesson is not that theory cannot proceed without 
philosophy. It typically does. It is rather that those moments when philosophy emerges 
from the background, as it does when prompted by Welling, repay attention.
On default conceptions, photography is understood as a mechanical process for 
producing ‘natural’ signs that (typically) resemble their causes. These conceptions 
of the photograph as an essentially passive trace or imprint of its referent, akin 
to the fingerprint, death mask, or footprint in the sand, systematically obscure 
the significance of practices such as Welling’s. The problem is not that Welling’s 
photographs do not incorporate material traces of the world; the problem is that we 
cannot get far in appreciating what Welling is up to so long as we focus narrowly on 
those features of his photographs that token the registration of light. Being told that 
the Aluminum Foil comprises a series of traces, imprints, or indices, for example, misses 
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almost everything of interest about them – certainly anything that might explain their 
aesthetic appeal or significance as art.
For all their manifold differences of emphasis and methodology, default 
conceptions of photography commit, implicitly, to a view of the medium as 
essentially receptive – more passive than active. Susan Sontag’s Bazinian reflections 
on photographs as ‘direct impressions’, ‘material vestiges’, or ‘stencils’ of the real is 
an obvious example.11 Sometimes photographic receptivity is expressed through a 
metaphysics of self-generation, as in Henry Fox-Talbot’s infamous claim that Lacock 
Abbey was the first building ‘that was ever yet known to have drawn its own picture’.12 On 
Fox-Talbot’s reasoning, it has to be the building that inscribes itself, through the action 
of light, on the sensitive surface because photographic agency is natural, not human.
Roland Barthes implicitly conceives of photography as receptive in a similar way 
when he characterizes the ‘punctum’ as the unintended but affecting marginal detail 
that is revealed in the photograph, despite passing unnoticed by the photographer. 
So construed, the punctum is possible for Barthes precisely because the photograph 
records what was there, no matter what might have been of interest to the 
photographer. The same implicit commitment to receptivity is echoed in Barthes’s 
more general claim that the noeme of photography is ‘that-has-been’.13 Likewise, C. S. 
Peirce characterizes photographs as ‘indexical icons’ – images whose resemblance 
to their sources is a result of a distinctive process that ensures ‘point by point’ 
correspondence to their sources. Peirce’s examples may be divided into two broad 
kinds: the index as trace or residue of its cause (the footprint in the sand, ashes in the 
grate), and the index as indication, ostention, or deixis that requires the co-presence 
of its referent to flesh out an otherwise empty designation (the pointing finger, the 
linguistic shifters, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘look!’ ‘that’).14 Barthes ‘noeme’ brings them together: that 
(index as ostention) has been (index as trace).15
Rosalind Krauss, whose work on the index from the late 1970s was hugely 
influential for art theory’s inheritance of these ideas, conceives photography in broadly 
similar terms when she presents it – drawing freely on Barthes and Peirce – as a natural 
rather than conventional mode of imaging. Barthes’s ‘message without a code’, conjoined 
with a Peircian view of indices as traces or residues of their causes, becomes Krauss’s 
‘physical manifestation of a cause’.16 Much as ‘the natural world […] imprints itself on 
the photographic emulsion’, so the surrounding environment is ‘merely registered’ 
by the kind of site-specific installation about which Krauss was then writing.17 The 
conception of photography underlying this account would have been recognizable in 
its essentials to Joseph Nicéphore Niepce, Louis Jacques Mandé Daguerre, and William 
Henry Fox-Talbot, for all that Krauss is putting it to quite different uses.18
Despite their manifold (and manifest) differences, and for all that they mean 
different things in different contexts, these writers implicitly concur in viewing 
photography as more or less passively recording the world.
Until recently, philosophers were also united in conceiving of photography as 
essentially receptive.19 Obviously, the photographer must decide what to photograph 
and select a suitable vantage point, she must choose a camera, lens and film, determine 
what will be in focus and how to frame and expose the scene. After the fact, she may 
again exert control, either in the darkroom or through a software application. But all 
this takes place either before or after the moment of exposure. So long as the shutter 
is open, the mapping of features from scene to light-sensitive surface depends solely 
on camera and lens. Because the recording event is not itself under the agent’s control, 
photographs are visual traces: they cannot but register whatever is in front of the 
camera, subject to the camera variables applied.
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A new generation of philosophers has broken with this consensus.20 While 
they acknowledge an ineliminable moment of photographic receptivity, they also 
emphasize photographs’ material origins. In this, they take their inspiration from 
the process-first approach proposed by Patrick Maynard in The Engine of Visualization. 
Maynard objected to the widespread tendency to ‘consider photography in terms of its 
products, photographs, and then […] consider some significant relationship that these 
products bear to some other thing or things’.21 What constitutes a photograph is not 
some special relationship photographs bear to their objects; what makes something 
a photograph is its genesis in a photographic process. Because Maynard himself stops 
short of characterizing the elements of this process, the question becomes: what is a 
photographic process?
The new conception builds on Maynard’s idea that photography is a process 
by proposing that any photographic process has (at least) four stages, each of them 
an event.22 The first is a pro-photographic scene, a worldly happening before a 
photographic apparatus. (So not any bit of the world is a pro-photographic scene; its 
being such depends on the presence of the apparatus itself.) Second is the formation, 
by the photographic apparatus, of a dynamic light image, a two-dimensional pattern 
of light that changes over time in concert with changes in the pro-photographic scene. 
The light image is not an artifactual image: in most (if not all) cases, it occurs inside 
the camera but it is not typically visible there (the camera obscura is one exception). 
Stage three is a ‘photographic event’, properly so called, where information contained 
in the light image is recorded, either chemically or electronically.23 Even at this stage, 
there is no artifactual image – that is, no image made to be displayed or amenable to 
visual appreciation, because nobody can see the pattern of silver halide compounds 
in an emulsion or charged and non-charged states of metal-oxide semi-conductors in 
a CCD. A fourth stage of mark-making (broadly construed) is required before there is 
an image that can be visually appreciated. Printing with photosensitive emulsion or 
inkjet, projecting slides, or displaying pixels: photography exploits a rich and diverse 
family of technologies for rendering marked or patterned surfaces suitable for visual 
appreciation. Importantly, though, none of them is uniquely photographic and none 
suffices on its own to generate a photograph.
The new conception, building upon Maynard, has several merits. It redirects 
attention from product to process, which it takes to be a technology for making 
marked or differentiated displayable surfaces, leaving out no part of the photographic 
process. The moment of receptivity reduces to the photographic event, a bit of base-
level causation where photons emitted or reflected by an object modify the electrical 
states of semiconductors or silver halide molecules. Unlike conceptions of photography 
as fundamentally receptive, which stop here, the new conception includes the pro-
photographic scene, the dynamic light image, and various processing and mark-
making technologies as genuine constituents of photography. Because all four stages 
are necessary for making an image that can be visually appreciated, none can be 
excluded from the domain of photography ‘proper’. As a corollary, the photographer 
acts within the domain of the ‘strictly photographic’ whenever she intervenes in any 
one of the four stages.
On this conception, an image counts as photographic so long as it implicates a 
photographic event in its causal history. This is photography’s ineliminable moment 
of receptivity, but the new conception shrinks it to a point. Beyond this point, both 
before and after it, the new conception opens up the space of photographic possibility, 
prompting us to attend to the many means photographers employ to mobilize 
photography’s causal substrate, the registration of a light image, in the service of 
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their artistic ends. By contrast, conceptions that over-burden receptivity tend to treat 
photography as a black box. Welling’s practice takes the lid off this box and, in doing 
so, demonstrates the range and malleability of the photographic process.
Work in Process
Welling’s work is often viewed in terms of oppositions such as camera-less versus 
lens-based, abstract versus representational, analogue versus digital, or colour versus 
black and white. But the fluidity with which Welling moves between and across such 
categories suggests that parsing the work in this way misses something crucial about 
what he is doing. The new conception makes sense of the unity of Welling’s practice, by 
understanding it in terms of a broader photographic process and possibility space that 
individual series thematize in diverse ways, depending on where in the photographic 
process Welling most prominently invests his agency.
Aluminum Foil focuses attention on the pro-photographic scene. As in much of 
Welling’s work from the early 1980s (Phyllo (1980) and Drapes (1981), Gelatin (1984) and 
Tile Photographs (1985)), the photographed scene is not found as-is, but is constructed 
from the ground up. Despite any initial obstacles to deciphering what one is looking 
at, photography is figured across these series as recording whatever is in front of 
the camera at the moment of exposure, just as default conceptions would have it. 
While the new conception accepts that the camera records whatever is before it, 
it also proposes a conception of the photographed scene as pro-photographic, an 
essential stage of the photographic process itself. In Aluminum Foil, the scene cannot be 
understood as independent of the photographer’s agency and intervention, because it 
has been constructed with the camera in mind. If the practice can still be understood 
4 James Welling, 9818, 2009. 
Inkjet print, 33 × 50 in. Photo: 
Courtesy of James Welling.
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in terms of ‘the document’, it is a document of a very peculiar kind – a document 
of what the photographer has done, off camera, with an eye to the camera that will 
record it. The vision of an independent, extra-photographic reality recedes: it fails to 
capture how the camera can be a condition not only of recording reality, but of the 
pro-photographic scene itself. Had there been no camera to record it, the scene would 
not have existed.24
Contrast Aluminum Foils with the later Glass House series (2006–09) (plate 4). The pro-
photographic scene is now Philip Johnson’s Glass House set in the Connecticut landscape. 
But Welling’s focus is no longer on constructing the scene; instead he undertakes to 
disrupt the light image that the scene casts on his camera’s sensor, using what he declares 
to be a unique technique.25 Whereas digital post-production permits precise control, filters 
interrupt the optics of the camera in ways that are hard to predict.26 Glass House’s colour 
effects were obtained by handling coloured gel, plastic, and glass in front of the camera 
during exposure. In the standard trope, Welling’s camera doubles the house, which is a 
single room, or camera, and a lens onto the landscape – or a Claude Glass.27 Yet this cannot 
be the whole story, for it applies equally to any photograph of the glass house, and so 
misses the particularity of Welling’s interventions in the formation of the light image.
That we are being asked to attend to the particularities of Welling’s way of 
rendering the Glass House is intimated by various subtle tells in the images. Looking 
closely, one can make out Welling, with camera and tripod, reflected in several of 
the head-on images (such as 0467, 2009) (plate 5). This is one of the rare occasions 
where Welling appears in his own work.28 It suggests that Glass House strives to embody 
something of his own experience of the place as he photographs it. Welling’s handling 
of filters and glasses is a performance; indeed it is highly improvised. The series 
5 James Welling, 0467, 2009. 
Inkjet print, 33 × 50 in. Photo: 
Courtesy of James Welling.
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6 James Welling, 24, 2006. 
Chromogenic print, 46 × 37 in. 
Photo: Courtesy of James 
Welling.
displays the kind of unexpected variation that comes with improvisation, and thereby 
draws attention to the presence of the performer. Welling confirms, ‘when I am there, 
I am keenly aware that just being there is an event. The filters in a strange way amplify 
and double that being there.’29 The point is worth pursuing. By showing himself 
reflected with camera in a glass house that is itself a camera in the landscape, Welling 
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7 James Welling, 3, 2006. 
Chromogenic print, 46 × 37 in. 
Photo: Courtesy of James 
Welling.
identifies his own images’ ‘failure’ of legibility with the house’s failure to tame the 
landscape into a series of discrete views.
Welling’s procedure in Flowers (2004–07) is quite different. At first blush, what 
these images show may seem obvious. Though their colour effects are difficult to 
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resolve, they seem to depict some kind of foliage, with a hint of strong sun irradiating 
the edges (plate 6 and plate 7). Yet the series poses an even greater challenge to default 
conceptions of photography. For in this case there was not even a worldly scene to 
record, if that is understood to require something prior to and independent of the 
camera. Rather, a pro-photographic scene has been created ex nihilo in Welling’s 
darkroom, which has itself become a camera that Welling steps inside, so as to work 
directly on the photographic event.
The multi-stage process that leads to Flowers begins with making a photogram, a 
camera-less contact print generated by selectively occluding a light-sensitive surface 
exposed to light. Photograms are one of the oldest photographic methods, going back 
to Fox-Talbot’s 1830s camera-less images of lace and leaves. Where Fox-Talbot used the 
sun, Welling uses the bulb of the enlarger. That aside, Welling’s photograms are made 
in an entirely traditional way. Objects are laid directly onto a light-sensitive surface, 
which is then exposed to light. Occluded areas of the surface remain unchanged; areas 
exposed to light blacken when developed. In Flowers, however, that surface is film rather 
than photographic paper.
The resulting film photograms are then used as negatives to make prints with an 
enlarger in the standard way. In effect, Welling is creating negatives from scratch in his 
darkroom, without the aid of a camera. The film negatives (the original photograms) 
are black and white. Colour is added later, during a second print stage, by sandwiching 
coloured gels in the enlarger’s mixing box. Light, originally filtered by the opacity of the 
flowers occluding the film, is filtered for a second time by the gels so that semi-transparent 
tones of grey register as colours. Where the blossoms directly touched the film during 
the original exposure, no light will have penetrated (assuming they are opaque) leaving 
the film clear. Where they were merely close to the film, some light will have penetrated, 
producing delicate, gauzy greys – and the same will be true of anything less than fully 
opaque, such as translucent petals. Filtering light through coloured gels transforms these 
greys into hues. Because the original film images are negatives, solid shapes are rendered 
negatively in clear, unexposed film; at the print stage these clear areas allow light to pass 
freely, resulting in positive images of flowers in the form of coloured light.
It cannot be correct, as one critic writes, that the Flowers are ‘a stunning vehicle 
with which to capture and represent [the] actual subject: light phenomena’, as this 
would make the flowers merely instrumental to the depiction of light.30 Light is 
equally a vehicle for the flowers, and the point generalizes. While the challenge of the 
photogram, to use objects to modulate light, may appeal to an interest in abstraction, 
it is just as much the challenge of photographic representation more generally to use 
objects to modulate light and thereby depict them. Light is both subject and vehicle.
Consider what is gained by adding colour to monochrome images. In everyday 
life, flowers are quintessentially coloured objects, classic tokens of beauty.31 Welling’s 
Flowers operate in a different register entirely. Evoking the experience of dappled sunlight 
beneath trees, this is not an everyday depiction of flowers as nature morte; it images beauty 
in a much deeper sense. Welling welcomes a characterization of them in terms of 
‘presentness’, a being at home in the present, rather than dwelling on time, absence, or 
loss.32 Flowers express sheer joy in the world’s visible presence and the sun’s gift of light. 
They are the antithesis of Aluminum Foil. Where light struggles to penetrate the lifeless, 
suffocating world of the foils, here it overflows to the point of irradiating the image.
Something else about Welling’s process in Flowers is easily overlooked but sheds light 
on his practice as a whole. The original photograms are made on 400 ASA Kodak Tri-X 
film. The film’s sensitivity to all visible light precludes the use of a red safety light while 
exposing the photograms in the darkroom. Any light would fog the film. So the choice 
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of film over paper necessitates that the photograms be arranged in total darkness, 
generating a complex interplay of activity and passivity in the making of Flowers. 
Welling exercises his agency in setting up the process and its parameters but must 
surrender control at the moment of execution. Though Welling can work by touch in 
the dark, it is only once the enlarger light is tripped, exposing the film to light – only 
when it is already too late – that he sees the pattern of foliage he has placed on the film, 
and is able to form a determinate visual impression of how the final image might look. 
At the crucial moment, he is photographing blind.
Doing so demands an openness to fortuitous accident.33 Meeting this demand 
indicates Welling’s confidence that the world will meet him half way. Call such openness 
‘trust in the world’. Stronger than a disposition, it is an ability: it requires self-possession 
to suspend doubt for long enough to find out where blind avenues may lead. Some will 
see this as a generic artistic virtue – one that befits any artist who wishes to produce 
something new – and there is much to be said for this view. But Welling’s self-possession 
can also be seen as peculiarly photographic, for no image depends more directly on 
the world, one might think, than a photograph. Photographers rely on input from the 
world in a direct and concrete way, even if they are not constrained by it in all the ways 
that conceiving photography as a purely receptive affair would have us imagine. Being a 
photographer involves knowing what to do with, and how to respond to, what the world 
provides. Different kinds of photography no doubt mobilize this know-how in different 
ways, and at different stages of the process; but whenever a process involves trial and 
error, the photographer must rely on know-how and past experience to indicate the 
directions likely to prove profitable for exploration. At the crucial moment, Welling may 
be photographing blind, but the making of Flowers is anything but floundering: the set-up 
is tailor-made to solicit the fortuitous accident, the quirk of circumstance or process, that 
prevents Welling falling back into the trap of the tried and tested.
As Aluminum Foil, Glass House, and Flowers (three out of more than sixty series 
listed on Welling’s website) suggest, Welling draws on resources at every stage of the 
photographic process.34 We see the staging and construction of the pro-photographic 
scene in Aluminum Foil. The landscape in Glass House is fashioned by redirecting the flow 
of light with mirrors and filters before it enters the camera, thereby impacting the 
formation of the light image. And the camera is often left behind altogether to direct 
the photographic event in the darkroom, as in Flowers. The idea that photographers 
insert themselves into the photographic process primarily by screening light is brought 
out in numerous ways, not limited to the selective occlusion of light, the use of more 
or less reflective or absorptive materials, and the iterated use of colour filters and gels. 
Baffles and screens of various kinds proliferate. Optical artefacts abound – not only 
lens flare but moiré patterns. Every imaginable print technology is used, from straight 
silver to inkjet, from one-stage printing to more than three, from 4 × 5″ contact prints 
to large scale, from traditional to hybrid technologies that move freely back and forth 
between analogue and digital, colour and black and white. Welling is well aware that 
his practice implies a capacious conception of the medium: ‘I’m interested in finding 
new ways of applying materials to a surface […] Photography is just a different way of 
applying material and some of my works draw out this process.’35
Although important, such technical considerations are only one dimension of 
Welling’s practice. A fourth series allows us to revisit those already considered, with a 
more direct eye to their expressive content and emotional valence. In Frolic Architecture 
(2010), Welling rejoins a longstanding, if often implicit, project to use the resources of 
photography to express the significance of history for individual lives. His stance does 
not reduce history to temporal distance, the ‘that-has-been’ of photographic cliché. It is 
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more solicitous, even as it concedes its own limits and the impossibility of containing 
the past in the present without remainder. It distills a sense of what might be called the 
‘deep present’.
Frolic Architecture is a set of ten photograms made to illustrate a poem of the same 
title by Susan Howe (plate 8 and plate 9).36 The process builds on the one developed for 
Water (2009), where Welling immersed sheets of chromogenic paper in water and 
exposed them to light prior to developing them. Prolonged soaking frees up the water-
soluble blue die in the surface of the paper. By exposing the paper to light, Welling 
causes the paper to record an image of its own surface at the moment of exposure. 
In seeing the resulting picture, one is seeing a prior semi-liquid state of the very 
surface one is looking at. It is hard to imagine a more direct reminder of the labour 
of photography; these images demand that the viewer pay attention to what has taken 
place – to what the photographer has done – to generate the surface they are currently 
seeing. Leaving no room for doubt, Frolic Architecture adds a layer of manual performance 
to the process: Welling folds sheets of mylar and contact prints them to silver gelatin 
paper. Contact printing is, as the name suggests, laying one surface (typically a 
negative) onto another (typically a sheet of photographic paper), holding the two 
flat with a sheet of glass and exposing to light, thereby producing an inversion of the 
negative on the print. In this case the ‘negatives’ are hand-rendered: Welling adds paint 
before or after folding the sheets of mylar, until they are rendered opaque, such that no 
light can pass through them to form an image. The resulting images are scanned and 
inkjet printed, before being bound into books.
With Frolic Architecture, there is a direct connection between how the work has 
been made and its content, a connection that is thematized within the work itself. Its 
8 James Welling (right) and 
Susan Howe (left), spread 
from Frolic Architecture, 
Grenfell Press, 2010. 
Inkjet print and letterpress, 
8 1/2 × 11 in. Photo: Courtesy 
of James Welling.
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making echoes the work of both Howe and her principal sources, the New England 
revivalist theologian Jonathan Edwards and his sister Hannah Edwards Wetmore, who 
kept a diary in the 1730s on large folio sheets folded into small panels. Books are made 
from the same folded sheets, the folds cut away to leave pages. Howe’s poem sequences 
collages of photocopied text that she snips, twists, and tapes onto the page. When 
read aloud, snippets of visible text become phoneme fragments that ventriloquize the 
past in an elusive voice, as though one were overhearing fragments of a conversation 
that only just reaches the threshold of intelligibility.37 Combined with Howe’s text, 
Welling’s images recall his earlier photographs (taken in 1977–86) of pages of his 
own great-great-great grandparents’ travel diaries from their grand tour in 1840–41 
(plate 10).38 Some pages are shown in full, some partially, some highlight the elegance of 
the script, the deep black ink, the texture of the paper. Many include pressed objects or 
slips of paper, material fragments of stops along the tour. In both series, the handling 
of materials forges a link to the material, if fragmented, reality of the Edwards and the 
Dixons – in the case of Welling’s painterly images, the expressive gesture summoning 
up the script of his forbears.
Unlike portrait photography, which figures subjectivity as autonomous and self-
contained, Frolic Architecture and Diary/Landscape represent it metonymically and partially, 
through its material traces. Domestic rather than heroic, the past self bleeds into the 
present through barely overheard snatches of conversation, fragments of script, dried 
flowers and other mementos. This is not some simple exercise of recollection; instead, 
the material traces of past subjectivity are rematerialized through the workings of 
photography. We are reminded just how much photography involves the handling 
of physical materials in addition to the screening and control of light. Contrary to 
9 James Welling, spread from 
Frolic Architecture, Grenfell 
Press, 2010. Inkjet print and 
letterpress, 8 1/2 × 11 in. 
Photo: Courtesy of James 
Welling.
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expectations, abstraction here embodies, in muted form, the afterlife of the historical 
by means of the material processes of photography.39
Frolic Architecture and Diary/Landscape attend, in different ways, to the afterlife of the 
past in the present, thereby distilling a sense of the present’s depth. Flowers suggests a 
welcoming of the present moment, a ‘being-in-the-present’ rather than a dwelling 
on absence or loss. Yet Aluminum Foils and Glass House suggest something much more 
equivocal. Aluminum Foils seem to wall up space in such a way as to emphasize the 
impenetrability and obduracy of the depicted world. These are alien, inhuman spaces, 
grave-like environments devoid of oxygen or light. Where Flowers suggests a free 
welcoming of the world, these early works are their inverse.
The idea of being – or not being – at home in the world is a latent theme of 
Welling’s work more generally. Johnson’s Glass House is in Connecticut, where Welling 
grew up and his family history runs deepest. Several of Welling’s apparently more 
straightforward series, not considered here, have documented aspects of the Eastern 
seaboard, including its railways and architecture. But if Connecticut in some sense 
signifies ‘home’ for Welling, then it operates in his work more as an idea or beacon 
than as a physical location. It signifies what it might mean were we able – and we are 
not – to close the gap between mind and world.
For much of the modern aesthetic tradition, to find something beautiful is itself 
to feel at home in, or at one with, the world in a metaphysically significant way. 
10 James Welling, A9, 1977–
86, from Diary/Landscape. 
Gelatin silver contact print, 
3 3/4 × 4 5/8 inches. Photo: 
Courtesy of James Welling.
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Natural beauties such as flowers – perhaps precisely because they are fleeting – have 
traditionally functioned as classic tokens of such significance. In Immanuel Kant’s 
foundational version of this thought, the distinctively cognitive, rather than merely 
sensory, pleasure afforded by beautiful nature hints that the natural world may ‘favour’ 
us in some way. To find nature beautiful is to come across something that strikes us as 
so suited to the interaction and attunement of our most fundamental sense-making 
capacities that it seems as if – but only as if – it were designed for that very purpose. 
In this way, natural beauty intimates that, despite nature’s potentially bewildering 
complexity, our epistemic and moral goals of making systematic sense of it and acting 
freely within it may not be in vain. The subjective qualification is crucial: the thought 
concerns how human beings are constrained to view nature, in so far as they aspire 
to make systematic sense of or act freely within it. The claim is not about how nature 
is in itself, which is something that we cannot know and should not pronounce 
upon, lest we fall back into the sense-transcending claims of speculative metaphysics. 
Nonetheless, the unexpectedness and sheer welcome of this intimation is grounds for 
pleasure. This is what Kant means when he calls beauty ‘subjectively purposive’: the 
kind of cognitive stimulation it affords is suited to furthering our most basic epistemic 
and moral projects.40
Assuming that this Kantian thought articulates what it would mean, 
metaphysically, to feel ‘at home’ in the world, Glass House suggests that the feeling can 
only be approached asymptotically, through a series of partial, disorienting views. 
Pulsating with colour and jarring superimpositions, Glass House hardly suggests 
harmonious, contemplative repose. Instead, light throbs and colour is overwhelming: 
sometimes stifling, sometimes blinding or bone-chilling, sometimes jumpy, nervous, 
and edgy – always ‘visually intoxicating’.43 Welling’s description of the series as 
an analytic decomposition of vision into its trichromatic channels is potentially 
misleading: for it leaves out how the channels are made to interfere with each other, 
subverting the optical legibility of which Johnson’s Glass House is an icon. Reflecting 
materials held before the camera layer and rearrange the landscape in ways that are 
impossible to resolve. In 9818, 2009, for example, the sun on the photographer’s back 
reappears above the house so as to transform the entire landscape, and not just that 
bit of it that falls within his camera’s field of view (see plate 4). The images seem to 
capture an experience of the world as resisting the mind’s organization of sensation 
into a coherent, cognitively well-ordered reality – an experience that William James 
described as ‘one great blooming, buzzing confusion’ cognitively prior to ‘our location 
of all things in one space’.42 The ideology of the glass house as an architectural type 
is that it tames and interiorizes its site by turning it into a series of vistas. As Johnson 
famously quipped: ‘Nature is the most expensive wallpaper’. In Welling’s Glass House, 
by contrast, the Connecticut landscape is a force that cannot be contained, but always 
outstrips the order the house seeks to impose. In Jamesian terms, it outruns the 
synthetic powers of mind, for which the house – itself a camera – serves as a metaphor 
or analogue. Unlike Johnson’s Glass House, Welling’s is closer to James’s experience of 
refusal, breakdown, and perpetual deferral of legibility and sense.
Photography, Mind, and Self
How does re-conceptualizing photography help us to understand Welling’s practice 
as it has been presented here – as both rich in formal, technical experimentation, and 
thematically dense and complex? On any conception that would identify photography 
with an event of transcription, much of what Welling does may be ‘photographic’, or 
perhaps ‘photographically derived’; but it cannot be photography, strictly speaking. For the 
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same reason, any thematic, emotional, or intellectual concerns that Welling addresses by 
intervening in the pro-photographic scene, the light image, or post-recording processes 
will by necessity reside outside the domain of photography. Welling’s concerns might 
explain why he does what he does, but they cannot explain what makes what he does 
photography, as long as photography is conceived as a mode of receptivity – an essentially 
natural (non-agential) registration of a light image, akin to the footprint in the sand. 
The revised conception proposed here represents photography much more capaciously, 
revealing Welling’s exploration of diverse photographic materials and processes to be a 
coherent exploration of a unified domain of photographic possibility.
Aluminum Foil, Glass House, Flowers, and Frolic Architecture involve different stages of the 
photographic process. To what end does Welling explore this space of photographic 
possibility? Granted, he thematizes the richness of the photographic process. But why? 
Can the new conception also help us bring out a unity at the level of his expressive 
and poetic concerns? His more perceptive critics acknowledge the traces that such 
concerns have left in his work, but to date have done little more than label them – as 
‘aching beauty’ and ‘vulnerability’, or the ‘sensuous’ and ‘sheerly aesthetic’.43 Moreover, 
these labels leave mysterious the connection between Welling’s passion for materials 
and processes and the deeper metaphysical and poetic concerns of his work. An 
adequate conception of photography needs to do more than merely fencepost the 
boundaries of a technology; it has to equip us to investigate what can be done with 
it. Refusing to treat it as a black box, Welling understands the camera as an apparatus 
engineered over centuries to produce a coherent image of the world in accordance 
with a highly specific set of pictorial conventions:
You have the history of image-making always on the surface of any photograph 
you make. All these technicians made all these decisions about what kind of 
light rays will be rendered on this material surface. When you take a piece of 
chalk and a piece of paper, no one is telling you what to do. But photography is 
so specific about what can be rendered […] that specificity is something that I 
have always found exciting.44
By drawing attention to what it is and is not possible to render photographically, and 
its history, Welling equates photographic processes in general (and not merely the 
camera) with the synthetic, ‘sense-making’ capacities of mind.
A central tradition in modern philosophy, originating in Kant and continuing 
into contemporary philosophy of mind, takes the basic problem of mind to be one of 
clarifying the relation between ‘spontaneity’ and ‘receptivity’.45 The relation is between 
the conceptual structure spontaneously imposed by mind on matter provided by 
the world. Both are conditions of coherent experience: spontaneity is a condition of 
making sense and receptivity is a condition of experience having some content to make 
sense of. According to this tradition, the spontaneous mind ‘synthesizes’ (constructs, 
combines, brings together) coherent experience of an objective world from passively 
received external input. Developed as a tool for standardized imaging, the camera itself 
is a supreme example of spontaneity: it builds the synthetic powers of cognition into 
the apparatus itself. But photographic spontaneity transcends the camera; it pervades 
any use of photographic materials to make sense of the stimuli received from the 
world. Taken as a whole, Welling’s oeuvre not only shows us this sense-making in 
action, but also where it breaks down.
This conception of photography as an achievement of representation reverses the 
standard picture of photography as pure receptivity, a process for passively recording 
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appearances. Yet spontaneity always runs up against what is outside itself, given that 
experience is not a product of mind all the way down. For just this reason, exploring 
the realm of photographic possibility limns the boundaries of spontaneity. In Welling’s 
work, states of heightened emotion dramatize the self’s attempts to make sense of its 
world. A vertiginous world induces the stifling confinement of the Aluminum Foils and the 
buzzing profusion of Glass House. Flowers capture the joy of being in the present moment, 
while Frolic Architecture mines the present for the fragmentary echoes of the past.
But Welling’s individual projects do not merely present the constitutive relation 
between mind and world impersonally, by using photographic materials and processes 
as an analogy for the world-constructing, sense-making powers of mind. Though 
this is a concern of Welling’s work as a whole, his more powerful series catalyze a 
particular mood or feeling to embody the experience of an individual, empirical self 
as it tries to make sense of its world. This requires careful unpacking. The relation 
between self and world is neither Welling’s subject matter nor his work’s thematic 
content, if that is taken to mean what it depicts. His images depict a broad swath of 
things, and some of them do not depict at all. Rather, various possible relations of self 
to world are enacted through Welling’s explorations of the resources of photography.
Photography, Welling’s practice implies, is at root a relation between two terms 
– not only photograph and world, but also photographer and world. Photography’s 
medium is the screening of light at some stage of making an image, plus the 
manipulation of various materials and image-rendering processes. Light is not only 
a condition of photography, but also its limiting threat. Without at least one light 
exposure there can be no photograph, but too much or too little light, or the right 
amount but at the wrong time, and the image will be fogged or destroyed entirely.46 If 
photography is a relation between a photographer and world, and light is the medium 
of that relation, then Welling’s manipulation of light acknowledges the vulnerability 
of the human individual to the twin prospects of being overwhelmed (over-exposed 
or flooded) by the richness of what the world has to offer or of being under-nourished 
(under-exposed, under-developed) by the paucity of what it provides. The surfeit of 
light in Flowers and the poverty of light in Aluminum Foils – the one irradiating to the 
point of eating away the image, the other being sucked away into darkness – express 
these twin possibilities. Other series, such as Light Sources, occupy a middle ground of 
equanimity, even attentiveness and openness to whatever the world presents to view.
It is important to see that the relation between a priori mind, empirical self, 
and world operates at two distinct levels throughout Welling’s practice. At the level 
of his practice as a whole, the persistence with which Welling mobilizes the diverse 
resources of photography draws attention to the relation between mind and world at 
an impersonal, constitutive level. By making use of such a broad range of processes, 
including (but not limited to) camera-based operations, his oeuvre foregrounds the 
constitutive, sense-making dynamic of mind and world per se. At the level of the 
individual series, however, the work thematizes a variety of psychological responses 
to the empirical self’s dependence on its world. At this level, it is no longer some 
impersonal or constitutive relation between mind and world that is at stake – it is 
Welling’s.
This may explain the seam of ‘recessive autobiography’ that seems to permeate 
many of Welling’s projects, in much the same way as the metaphysics of home and 
its vicissitudes, from the fleeting appearance of his face in the early student work Film 
(1971) to his occasional reflection with camera and tripod in Glass House, including the 
allusions in many series to family and personal history. This persistent, if recessed, 
aspect of Welling’s practice intimates that photography comes not from the resources 
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of photography conceived impersonally, but from an individual photographer’s way of 
interacting with light, materials, and processes.
Conceptions of photography as receptive make no room for any of this 
because they effectively shrink what makes a depiction photographic to an event of 
transcription. Shrinking photography to the transcription event in this way may isolate 
what distinguishes photography from other forms of depiction, but it also ensures 
that whatever photographic artists do, they do outside of the domain of photography, 
strictly speaking. It unacceptably curtails the prospects for understanding photographic 
art if we must think that the very activities that make photographs art cannot also be 
the ones that make them photographs. The conclusion can only be that they are art, 
despite being photographs. Not so on the new conception: they are art at least partly 
because they are photographs.
By his own admission, at the outset of his career Welling cultivated an aesthetics of 
opacity, density, and difficulty, which he equated with ‘subjectivity, style, and gesture’.47 
In doing so, he embarked on a way of making photographs that put, and continues to 
put, photographic agency centre-stage. Photographic agency is not simply acting by 
means of making photographs, though traditional thinking about photography has a 
hard time granting even that.48 It is an agency enacted within the space of photography, 
a space that turns out to be much more capacious than is often supposed, at the point 
where the spontaneity of mind and the feeling self meet the materiality of world.
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